Monday, January 27, 2003 :::
I'd like to make a contribution to a discussion among Lily Malcolm, Jack Balkin, and Kate Malcolm on whether the President is allowed to take race into account in judicial nominations (and what makes it different from college admissions), but will satisfy myself with the following comment instead: I don't think the President should take race into account in nominations, because any restriction on what can influence state action has to be a restriction on its constituent parts. As a practical matter motives can be difficult to ascertain, but as a theoretical matter they are all-important for these kinds of considerations. If there is an action that, based on defensible criteria, Congress should take, but it has a disparate impact, tending to make things worse for one race (or simply not to make things as much better for them as for other races), then for Congress to take the opposite action would make things worse, relative to the alternative and relative to other races in the alternative, for the other races than for that one race. What I'm saying (since you can't figure it out from the text) is that, where action is a sequence of choices between alternatives, any "disparate impact" is a property of the whole set of alternatives, not of any one in isolation. (When it is suggested that a policy has a "disparate impact", it is usually being compared to either the status quo, or to the government deciding to do nothing in some isolated arena. Neither is necessarily appropriate.) We cannot, then, be expected to act in such a way as never to affect different races differently; it's just not possible. On the other hand, if we are at any point deliberately and systematically choosing policies because they particularly benefit one race, that's no good, either. (I have less problem with choosing an alternative in part because its benefits are spread differently from the way the benefits were distributed from previous decisions, but I can't defend that, it may change, and it's not to be quoted back to me in the future. In any case, affirmative action is different from this in that it is explicitly and deliberately racial, and not just a policy that happens to benefit certain races to the detriment of others in the process of doing something else.)
I'm more supportive of affirmative action when it's in action taken by private institutions, which I think should be able to seek just about any goal they want, but I'm also less opposed to affirmative action in police departments, where it may be able to improve the function of the department through improved community relations, for example. I'm still wary of it, though, because it does seem to be unconstitutional — and it makes sense the government should be disallowed from certain classes of action, even where they may seem to serve everyone's interest, because they so often will not and it's much easier to impose a hard-and-fast rule than to get in arguments for each implementation as to whether an exception should be made. That returns everything to the realm of politics, and vitiates the whole Constitution and the protections it tries to provide.
In summary, if President Bush chose Thomas because Thomas was the best candidate available, then the fact the Thomas is black shouldn't be held against him. If he chose Thomas because Thomas is black, then I'm rather more wary of the decision. If he chose Thomas because he thought Thomas was the best candidate available because Thomas is black, then I'm confused.
::: posted by dWj at 10:28 AM
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